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INTRODUCTION
On 3 February 2009 the South African Competition Tribunal (CT) handed
down a judgment in Competition Commission v Senwes Ltd Case No
110/CR/Dec06 (Senwes). In its decision the CT recognized the notion of a
‘margin squeeze’ as a distinct abuse in terms of s 8(c) of the Competition Act
89 of 1998 (the Act). By doing so, the CT chose to follow the prevailing
academic and judicial opinion in the United Kingdom and Europe with
regard to margin squeeze. In contrast to this convergence of opinion, the
United States Supreme Court recently delivered judgment in Pacific Bell v
linkLine Communications Inc No 07-512 [2009] (linkLine) in which it
unanimously rejected the idea that a margin squeeze is an abuse of a
dominant position under s 2 of the Sherman Act (formally known as the Act
of July 2, 1890, ch 647, 26 Stat 209, codiﬁed as amended at 15 USC § 1
through 15 USC § 7).
Our aim is to explore the controversial concept of a margin squeeze. The
initial part of this note will examine the theoretical underpinnings of this
abuse. Thereafter, the article will focus on the Senwes decision and will
compare its ﬁndings with the position in the United Kingdom, the European
Union and the United States.
THE ECONOMIC CONCEPT OF A ‘MARGIN SQUEEZE’
The economic phenomenon of a margin squeeze can be likened to a
constructive refusal to deal. It is a gradual commercial strangulation of a
downstream competitor by a dominant, vertically integrated undertaking
which controls access to an essential input and uses its upstream dominance
to extinguish competition at the downstream level (see Richard Whish
Competition Law 6 ed (2008) at 744–5). A margin squeeze typically arises in
the following circumstances:
1. A vertically integrated ﬁrm with dominance upstream also operates in a
competitive market downstream;
2. The dominant ﬁrm controls access to an essential input upon which
downstream competitors rely to compete in the downstream market;
3. The dominant ﬁrm leverages its dominance upstream by raising the
access price charged to downstream competitors.
The cumulative effect of these factors is that downstream competitors are
unable to earn a sufﬁcient margin to survive and are gradually squeezed out
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of the market. The elimination of downstream competition inevitably leads
to higher prices, lower output and the thwarting of any incentive to
innovate.
Notwithstanding the above, margin squeeze is a controversial concept. As
Wish op cit at 744–5 notes, as a general proposition (dominant) ﬁrms are
under no obligation to deal with other companies, including their
downstream competitors. Furthermore, even if such ﬁrms do supply a
downstream competitor, why should they be forced to do so on favourable
commercial terms? A system of competition law that forces dominant
companies to deal favourably with downstream rivals runs the risk of
subsidizing inefﬁcient competitors to the detriment of consumer welfare.
The doctrine could thus have a chilling effect on competition. Firms may
well think twice about investing in a costly input if they may be forced to
share it with others on advantageous terms.
The counter argument that is levelled at ‘margin squeeze sceptics’ is that
inefﬁcient entry does not need to occur as long as competition law
authorities only consider margin squeeze complaints by downstream
competitors that are at least ‘as efﬁcient’ as the dominant undertaking’s
downstream business (Roger J van den Bergh and Peter D Camesaca
European Competition Law and Economics 2 ed (2006) at 277). This would
require a thorough analysis of the costs of the incumbent’s downstream
operations incurred speciﬁcally to the particular goods or services provided.
The UK Ofﬁce of Fair Trading (OFT) has published useful guidance on
margin squeeze abuses: see ‘Guidance on the Assessment of Conduct’, OFT
441a (April 2004). The guidance note has been cited in two signiﬁcant UK
rulings: Genzyme Ltd v Office of Fair Trading [2004] CAT 4 and Albion Water
Ltd v Director General of Water Services [2006] CAT 36.
At paragraph 6.2 of the guidance note the OFT explains that when testing
for an unlawful margin squeeze, one should usually determine ‘whether an
efﬁcient downstream competitor would earn (at least) a normal proﬁt when
paying input prices set by the vertically integrated undertaking’. The
guidance note goes on to state that in practice this test entails assessing
whether the dominant vertically integrated undertaking’s downstream
business would be able to earn a normal proﬁt if it were charged the same
access price. As a result, the ‘as efﬁcient’ competitor test reduces the risk of
sponsoring inefﬁcient competition.
The greatest challenge for courts in applying the margin squeeze doctrine
lies in enforcement. Competition authorities are arguably not well placed to
decide what the right margin between wholesale and retail prices should be.
This is compounded by the fact that prices are rarely stable. Indeed, the most
fundamental principle of a market-based economy (of which competition
law is merely a part) is that prices will ﬂuctuate over time. What is a fair price
today could be an unfair price next year and vice versa. It seems that sectoral
regulators have an advantage here, since their expertise in a particular
industry is likely to lead to more accurate approximations of an appropriate
price. But even they may have trouble determining an appropriate price, as
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this depends on complex and often arbitrary choices concerning cost
allocation either to the wholesale or the retail level.
THE SENWES JUDGMENT: INTRODUCING MARGIN
SQUEEZE INTO SOUTH AFRICAN LAW
In Senwes the CT followed prevailing judicial and academic opinion in
relation to margin squeeze abuses in the UK and Europe (the position in
these jurisdictions will be explained fully below). The CT said (para 117):
‘[T]he concept of a margin squeeze is something relatively new in the literature
and case law of abuse of dominance. One of the reasons for its new found utility
is that margin squeeze cases frequently arise in the context of recently
liberalized markets. As we noted in the introduction this is a feature we see in
the grain industry as well.’
The tribunal’s remark on the utility of the doctrine in the context of
former state monopolies is crucial to understanding its introduction into
South African law in this particular matter. The facts of the case demonstrate
how it provided the tribunal with an ideal opportunity to articulate the
relevance of margin squeeze to South African competition law.
The facts
In December 2004 CTH Trading (Pty) Ltd (CTH), a company trading
grain, referred a complaint to the Competition Commission (CC). For the
purposes of this note the nub of the complaint was that Senwes Limited, a
vertically integrated ﬁrm dominant in the market for the storage of grain,
abused its dominance in this market (Senwes para 45). The alleged effect of
this abuse was to exclude rivals downstream in the market for the trading of
grain — a market in which Senwes operates, but is not dominant. The
margin squeeze allegation was that Senwes’s inﬂated grain storage tariffs
rendered its downstream trading rivals unable to compete effectively in the
market for trading grain (Senwes para 15).
The grain market in South Africa has distinct characteristics that are
relevant to the case. The ﬁrst is that the storage of grain in large silos was
previously regulated by the (now repealed) Co-Operatives Act 91 of 1981.
The Co-Operatives Act did not allow co-operatives to compete with each
other. The effect of this state intervention was that in most provinces in
South Africa all grain storage silos in a geographic area were owned by a
single co-operative. Following the change of government in the 1990s the
agricultural sector began to be liberalized. Senwes was sold to a group of
shareholders and, as a result of the historical regulation of the market, found
itself in a comfortable position where it controlled the lion’s share of silos
within prime agricultural territory (Senwes para 7). Senwes thus inherited a
virtual monopoly position in respect of the storage of grain. The CT notes
that, in addition to this, Senwes’s position was further entrenched because
construction and maintenance of silos is extremely costly, thereby deterring
the entry of potential competitors (Senwes para 10).
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The second important characteristic of the grain market is that grain can
now be traded as a commodity on the South African Futures Exchange
(Safex), which is now owned by the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE).
For grain to be traded on the Safex a ‘silo certiﬁcate’ must be issued by silos
registered with the Safex. This certiﬁcate is the negotiable instrument for
each trade and represents the holder’s entitlement to a speciﬁed quantity of
grain stored at a particular silo. The certiﬁcate will also reﬂect the grain
storage costs levied by the silo that is payable by the holder of the certiﬁcate.
Senwes is registered as a silo with Safex for the storage of grain. In addition to
this, Senwes also has a downstream operation that trades grain on the Safex.
Thus, the CT noted, Senwes is in a position where it controlled access to an
indispensible input for the trading of grain, whilst operating its own trading
arm in competition with traders who rely on access to the silos to trade
(Senwes para 75).
One of the CC’s principal allegations was that Senwes was abusing its
dominant position by preventing rival traders from earning a viable margin
on the trading of grain, given the price charged for long-term storage in
Senwes’s silos (Senwes para 118). The evidence led by the CC indicated that
prospective traders face a necessary cost of storage. The longer the grain is
stored, the higher the daily rate for storage becomes. The market price for
grain traded on the Safex does not fully reﬂect these storage costs — a fact
conceded by Senwes. Until 2003 Senwes had offered a capped storage tariff
to traders and farmers who stored grain beyond a ﬁxed number of days. In
2003, however, Senwes removed the beneﬁt of this capped tariff from traders
alone. The crux of the argument put forward by the CC, and accepted by the
CT, was that the new price Senwes charged to rival downstream traders was
such that if they had to store their grain beyond a hundred days, without the
beneﬁt of a capped storage price, they could not earn a viable margin on
trades to compete in the market. In essence, Senwes’s downstream trading
division had the beneﬁt of lower storage costs that were capped, meaning
they could earn sufﬁcient margin on trades to compete proﬁtably. The CC
put forward evidence from a Safex trader (Brisen (Pty) Ltd) that clearly
established that rival downstream traders faced an unsustainable price-cost
margin when faced with the storage costs levied by Senwes (Senwes para
129).
Application of the law
In applying the facts of the case to the law pertaining to margin squeeze
abuses, the CT chose to accept the test articulated by Robert O’Donoghue
and Jorge Atilano Padilla (The Law and Economics of Article 82 EC (2006) at
303). The United Kingdom Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) has
adopted the same test in the Genzyme case (supra). The test is as follows:
1. The supplier of the input must be vertically integrated and dominant
upstream;
2. Access to the input must be in some sense essential for downstream
competition;
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3. The prices charged by the dominant vertically integrated ﬁrm must
render the activities of an efﬁcient rival uneconomic;
4. There is no objective justiﬁcation for the prices charged.
In the Genzyme case (supra) the CAT held that the ﬁrst requirement did
not mean that the vertically integrated ﬁrm must be dominant downstream
as well. A ﬁnding of dominance upstream is sufﬁcient (Genzyme at 534). The
CT accepted this point at para 141 of the Senwes judgment. The CT notes
that the ﬁrst requirement of dominance had been unequivocally met —
Senwes had even conceded its dominance in the grain storage market. Nor
did Senwes contest the requirement that the input must be essential. The CT
stated that it was established that the storage of grain in silos is an absolute
must for traders to operate on the Safex (Senwes para 141). Lastly, the CT
seemed to have been persuaded by the argument that traders were ﬁnancially
incapable of duplicating this costly input. The CT therefore concluded that
access to the silos must be deemed ‘essential’ for the downstream market
(ibid).
It is in respect of the third requirement that Senwes challenged the
Commission. Senwes alleged that downstream traders were unable to make a
proﬁt not because of the access price being charged, but because they were
inefﬁcient (Senwes para 147). The CC however led the evidence of two of
the largest global grain traders — Cargill and Dreyfus — that they were being
squeezed as a result of Senwes’s pricing behaviour. The CT found that on the
balance of probability these ﬁrms were efﬁcient. The global standing of these
ﬁrms, in combination with the fact that they pursued innovation projects,
persuaded the CT that they were at least as efﬁcient as Senwes’s downstream
trading arm (Senwes para 148). Notwithstanding these submissions by the CC
as to the efﬁciency of Senwes’s competitors, Senwes also proposed an
alternative formulation of the third requirement of the margin squeeze test.
The alternative formulation was to assess whether Senwes’s trading arm
could proﬁtably operate with the same input costs as rival traders. (Senwes
para 149). The CT was unimpressed by Senwes’s failure to adduce any
evidence in this regard. Their failure meant that CT was left to presume that
Senwes did not pass on the same costs to its own trading division (ibid).
The ﬁnal leg of the test involves assessing whether the ﬁrm in question has
an objective justiﬁcation for its exclusionary conduct. The CT noted that
this equated to the ‘efﬁciency defence’, which is contained in s 8(c) and (d) of
the Act (Senwes para 150). In accordance with the construction of these
subsections it was necessary for the CT ﬁrst to ﬁnd that the conduct amounts
to an unlawful margin squeeze before then considering any efﬁciency
defences. The CT found that Senwes had engaged in unlawful exclusionary
behaviour that took the form of a margin squeeze (Senwes para 151). The CT
then afﬁrmed the principle that it is incumbent on the respondent to raise the
defence of objective necessity. The CT stated that Senwes had not articulated
a clear objective justiﬁcation in the pleadings. Although counsel for Senwes
had made reference to Ramsey pricing as one possible rationale for the
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW JOURNAL250
discriminatory pricing, counsel failed to argue how it would have a welfare
enhancing effect. The CT refused to entertain this unsubstantiated justiﬁca-
tion (Senwes para 179).
COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO MARGIN SQUEEZE
The European position on margin squeeze is roughly parallel to that of the
UK. A recent case is Deutsche Telekom (Case T-271/03, Deutsche Telekom AG
v Commission, ECR [2008] II-1747), where the European Court of First
Instance (CFI) accepted the European Commission’s deﬁnition of margin
squeeze (para 107):
‘[T]here is an abusive margin squeeze if the difference between the retail prices
charged by a dominant undertaking and the wholesale prices it charges its
competitors for comparable services is negative, or insufﬁcient to cover the
product-speciﬁc costs to the dominant operator of providing its own retail
services on the downstream market.’
This classiﬁcation seems to be applied in other margin squeeze cases as
well, and has also found its way into sector-speciﬁc regulation (see for
example Directive 2002/19/EC, which applies to the telecommunications
sector). Like the UK authorities, the European Commission clearly uses the
‘as efﬁcient’ competitor test (see Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission (supra)
para 199 and the Commission decision, Deutsche Telekom AG, OJ [2003]
L 263/9 para 102). This approach is followed by the CFI.
Controversy exists, however, given that the margin squeeze formula has
been based on form rather than effect. The case law suggests that harm can be
inferred from the mere existence of a squeeze — which means that it is not
necessary to prove any detrimental economic effects. The CFI in Deutsche
Telekom (para 235) held that ‘the [only] anti-competitive effect which the
Commission is required to demonstrate relates to the possible barriers which
the applicant’s pricing practices could have created for the growth of
competition in that market’.
The recent Telefónica decision shows, however, that the European
Commission does not shy away from conducting a thorough analysis of the
effects of the squeeze (see Commission decision, Telefónica, OJ [2008] C 83/5
at 543–618). This appears to show a willingness to put the margin squeeze
more in line with the mainstream of European dominance cases, which are
increasingly effects-based. On the whole it is likely that the margin squeeze
concept will play a large role in European dominance cases in the years to
come, especially in liberalized regulated network industries.
In the US, by contrast, the notion that a margin squeeze (or, in US
terminology, ‘price squeeze’) is a negative factor has lost a good deal of
ground the last few decades. In 1945, Judge Learned Hand accepted the
concept of margin squeeze in Alcoa (United States v Aluminum Co of Am 148
F2d 416, 438, 2d Cir [1945]). This case suggested that conduct of a vertically
integrated monopolist could be exclusionary if it left no ‘fair’ or ‘adequate’
margin between the wholesale price and the retail price. Times have changed
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since then, however, and the current US approach seems markedly different
from the ones adopted in the UK and the EU.
The linkLine (supra) judgment, delivered on 26 February 2009, shows that
the US Supreme Court does not accept margin squeeze as a distinct abuse
under s 2 of the Sherman Act. According to the court, the focus should be
either on predation under the Brooke Groupe standard (see Brooke Groupe v
Brown & Williamson Tobacco 125 L Ed 2d 168 [1993]), or on a refusal to
supply, which falls under the Aspen Skiing criteria (see Aspen Skiing Co v
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp 472 US 585, 601 [1985]). The linkLine judgment
seems largely to be inspired by the Trinko decision (Verizon Communications
Inc v Law Offices of Curtis v Trinko LLP 540 US 398 [2004]), which already
narrowed down liability based on Aspen Skiing (supra). Justice Roberts, who
delivered the majority opinion, noted (para 9) that:
‘Trinko . . . makes it clear that if a ﬁrm has no antitrust duty to deal with its
competitors at wholesale, it certainly has no duty to deal under terms and
conditions that the rivals ﬁnd commercially advantageous.’
Since the Sherman Act did not require the integrated ﬁrm to deal with
their downstream competitors in the ﬁrst place, there was no requirement to
offer access at the wholesale prices the plaintiffs would have preferred (see
paragraph 10 of the judgment) In addition, the court warned (para 11) that:
‘recognizing a price-squeeze claim where the defendant’s retail price remains
above cost would invite the precise harm we sought to avoid in Brooke Group:
Firms might raise their retail prices or refrain from aggressive price competition
to avoid potential antitrust liability’.
In the court’s view, recognizing the claim would be to ‘amalgamate’ a
meritless wholesale pricing claim with a meritless retail pricing claim into a
viable claim based on the relationship between the wholesale and retail prices
(linkLine para 11). It is important to be aware that the Supreme Court
believed that there was no antitrust duty to deal in linkLine, which makes it
different from the Senwes case.
Central to the court’s reasoning were a number of institutional concerns
(linkLine paras 12–13). The court observed that rules in antitrust law must be
clear and capable of being administered. The decision is also underpinned by
the belief that courts in general are ill-suited to decide, let alone monitor,
these types of cases. This argument seems to have been inspired by the fact
that the dominant ﬁrm’s conduct, including its pricing behaviour, was in fact
regulated by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). To be more
speciﬁc, the incumbent (AT&T) was bound to a number of mandatory
interconnection requirements as a condition resulting from a recent merger.
The court appeared to suggest that the claimants should have asserted their
rights at the FCC instead of the ordinary courts. Lastly, the courts believed
that a rule mandating on ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ margins for competitors
would be objectionable, since it left vertically integrated ﬁrms ‘no safe harbor
for their pricing practices’ (linkLine paras 13–14).
The linkLine judgment is a thought-provoking perspective on margin
squeeze, particularly when one considers the contrasting UK and EU
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positions. We concede that there are unquestionably many differences in fact
and law that would explain the variation in approaches. Nevertheless, the
court’s strong wording in linkLine has forcefully brought to an end the
concept of margin squeeze in US antitrust law.
COMMENT
It is evident that there is much debate about the concept of margin squeeze.
Although there seems to be a convergence of the UK, European, and now
also the South African approaches, the US Supreme Court’s position
indicates that the discussion is far from settled.
Overall, we welcome the approach of the CT in Senwes. Amargin squeeze
can indeed lead to a signiﬁcant lessening of competition. This will be the case
especially where a dominant position was not achieved by superior skill and
industry, but arose from a monopoly granted by government. Such (former)
state intervention is often the source of these cases, which can be discerned in
the UK, European and South African experiences to date. In these types of
cases one should be careful about making the assumption that the incumbent
ﬁrm has achieved its position by being more efﬁcient than others. Critics
may argue that the margin squeeze concept risks having a competition
dampening effect. Why would we take up antitrust action against a ﬁrm that
actually charges low prices? Such a stance ignores the fact that there is no
such thing as a ‘low price’ in abstracto. Prices can only be deemed low with
reference to a certain benchmark; for instance the costs incurred to produce
the speciﬁc goods or services. The fact that the retail prices are only
marginally above wholesale prices may indicate that there is ﬁerce
downstream competition, but may equally be a sign that the wholesale price
is artiﬁcially inﬂated. Equally, we do not share the belief of some critics that
the rule entails a great risk of sponsoring inefﬁcient competitors. Competi-
tion authorities and courts should simply abide strictly by the ‘as efﬁcient’
competitor test.
Apart from these general comments, there are a few other aspects worthy
of note in the Senwes ruling. It is a positive development that the CT chose to
deal with the foreclosure effect of the margin squeeze in great detail. It
summed up the evidence of the CC and traders, noting in particular that the
effect was clearly established in that one of the traders had ceased trading in
the Senwes area of inﬂuence. This summation of the exclusionary effect in
reaching a ﬁnding, in combination with the prior analysis of economic
evidence of foreclosure of the ‘as efﬁcient’ competitor, is signiﬁcant. By
doing so the CT chose to adopt a rigorous approach to the effects-based
analysis in the context of a margin squeeze, eschewing the controversial
European jurisprudence that allows for exclusionary effects to be inferred
without a thorough economic analysis. It is hoped that, post-Telefónica, not
only the European Commission but also the Community courts will fully
endorse the effects-based approach.
Nevertheless, aspects of the Senwes ruling are controversial. The fact that
the CT found Senwes’s downstream competitors to be efﬁcient by referring
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to their ‘global standing’ and the fact that they have pursued innovation
projects, does not represent sound economic reasoning. Such factors are
often poor indications of efﬁciency. For instance, the fact that the big Detroit
motor vehicle manufacturers all have considerable global standing (and
undoubtedly have also engaged in many innovative projects) does not
necessarily mean that those ﬁrms are efﬁcient — as recent events have
shown. It might have been better if the CT had kept its analysis ‘pure’, and
merely focused on cost allocation matters and the actual effects of the alleged
squeeze. It did so by raising the issue whether Senwes’s trading arm could
proﬁtably operate with the same input costs as rival traders, in effect using an
‘as efﬁcient competitor’ benchmark. Future litigants would be well advised
to pay particular attention when compiling evidence to support the claim
that its competitor is not ‘as efﬁcient’ as its own downstream operations.
Incumbents will prefer to use this standard, as it is more difﬁcult for new
entrants to meet than the ‘reasonably efﬁcient’ benchmark.
In any margin squeeze case, possible alternatives must also be carefully
analysed. If there is a reasonable alternative to access (meaning that the
facility upstream is not essential), there can be no margin squeeze. Therefore
the CT was right to consider the very high cost of constructing and
maintaining new silos, leading to its conclusion that the existing silos were
essential. However, it is submitted that there should have been some
additional analysis by the tribunal. In particular, the CT should have analysed
whether these costs were sunk (ie not retrievable if a ﬁrm decides to exit the
market and sell its assets). If there is a lively market for the sale of such assets,
the investment’s size in absolute terms may not be overly relevant.
Lastly, one should be careful in attaching too much weight to the fact that
Senwes removed the beneﬁt of the capped tariff ‘only’ from downstream
traders. Although this targeted behaviour could indeed be used as an addition
proxy for the abusiveness of Senwes’s conduct, such reasoning should not be
taken too far. It would be perverse if dominant ﬁrms, in order to minimize
the risk of antitrust liability, were given an incentive to raise prices across the
board.
CONCLUSION
The Senwes judgment introduces the concept of margin squeeze in South
African competition law. It is noteworthy that the CT seemed to have been
particularly inspired by the UK and European approaches, while paying no
attention to the differing US perspective. This schism seems to have been
widened since the US Supreme Court’s ruling in linkLine just two weeks
after Senwes. In particular, the focus the CT gave to the economic effects of
the conduct is welcomed. Rigorous economic analysis lies at the heart of
sound competition law policy.
Interpreting a margin squeeze as a distinct abuse in terms of s 8(c) of the
Act is a welcome development. It enables challenges to behaviour which
may severely disrupt competition, and which would otherwise not be dealt
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with. The doctrine’s Achilles heel is the practical difﬁculties associated with
enforcement. Courts and competition authorities are poorly placed to
determine what a ‘reasonable’margin for a downstream competitor ought to
be. The risk of incorrectly calibrating the doctrine may lead to over-inclusive
enforcement, which could have the effect of stiﬂing investment.
However, the doctrine could be useful in the context of former state
monopolies. Lowering the wholesale price to a level that reﬂects actual costs
incurred could mean ﬁercer competition in the downstream level, and may
ultimately increase consumer welfare. In that sense, less can truly be more.
PRE-INCORPORATION CONTRACTS: STATUTORY REFORM*
CAROLINE B NCUBE
Lecturer, University of Cape Town
INTRODUCTION
South African company law is undergoing a major two-stage overhaul that
will culminate in the coming into force of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.
The ﬁrst stage was completed with the coming into force of the Corporate
LawsAmendmentAct 24 of 2006 on 14 December 2007 (Proc 47 GG 30594
of 14 December 2007) and the second stage will be completed with the
coming into force of the CompaniesAct, 2008. ThisAct has been assented to
by the President and was published for information on 9April 2009 (GN 421
GG 32121 of 9April 2009). Section 225 of thisAct provides that it will come
into force on a dated ﬁxed by the President by proclamation in the Gazette,
which may not be earlier than one year following the date of presidential
assent. The earliest that theAct can come into force is therefore 9April 2010.
This note examines certain aspects of the regulation of pre-incorporation
contracts contained in s 21 of the Companies Act, 2008, read with the
deﬁnition of the term ‘pre-incorporation contract’ contained in s 1. The
policy considerations underlying the current provision regulating this issue
(s 35 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973) and some of the difﬁculties of
interpretation that section has presented will be considered, with a view to
evaluating whether there is any policy shift evident in s 21, and whether its
provisions represent an improvement on its predecessor. The formulation of
s 21 draws on the provisions of its counterpart in the recently amended New
Zealand Companies Act, 1993, and so consideration will also be given to
those provisions.
This note ﬁnds that although the imported provisions relating to
pre-incorporation contracts are based on a more balanced and nuanced
* I am indebted to Professor Richard Jooste, the late Professor Michael Larkin
and Graham Bradﬁeld for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this note.
The usual disclaimer applies.
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